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Abstract 
 
Leibniz speaks, in a variety of contexts, of there being two realms – a “kingdom of power or 
efficient causes” and “a kingdom of wisdom or final causes.” This essay explores an often 
overlooked application of Leibniz’s famous “two realms doctrine” to the natural world.  The first 
part turns to Leibniz’s work in optics for the roots of his view that nature can be seen as being 
governed by two complete sets of equipotent laws, with one set corresponding to the efficient 
causal order of the world, and the other to its teleological order.  The second part offers an 
account of how this picture of lawful over-determination is to be reconciled with Leibniz’s 
mature metaphysics. The third addresses a line of objection proposed by David Hirschmann to 
the effect that Leibniz’s doctrine undermines his stated commitment to an efficient, broadly 
mechanical account of the natural world. Finally the fourth part suggests that Leibniz’s thinking 
about the harmony of final and efficient causes in connection with corporeal nature may help to 
shed light on his understanding of the teleological unfolding of monads as well. 
 
 
Introduction 
  1In his attempt to reconcile piety and the new science, teleology and mechanism, final 
causation and efficient causation, Leibniz often speaks of there being two realms - a “kingdom of 
power or efficient causes” and “a kingdom of wisdom or final causes.”  He insists that “these two 
kingdoms everywhere permeate each other, yet their laws are never confused and never 
disturbed, so that the maximum in the kingdom of power and the best in the kingdom of wisdom, 
take place together” (SD 24/L 442).
1,2   
The peaceful coexistence of both realms, Leibniz maintains, reveals itself through various 
harmonies found throughout his metaphysical system.  One such harmony holds between “the 
physical realm of nature, and the moral realm of grace; that is, between God considered as 
designer of the machine of the universe, and God considered as monarch of the divine city of 
minds” (Mon 87/FW 280).  This first harmony arises, Leibniz maintains, because the reward and 
punishment of rational souls is brought about not by miraculous intervention but rather through 
the order of the natural world, “so that this globe, for example, must be destroyed and restored by 
natural means at such times as is required by the government of minds in order to achieve the 
punishing of some and the rewarding of others” (Mon 88/FW 280).  Another harmony arises in 
connection with Leibniz’s solution to the mind-body problem.  He famously maintains that 
“there is a perfect harmony between the perceptions of the monad and the motions of bodies, 
pre-established from the outset, between the system of efficient causes and that of final causes.  
And it is in that harmony that the agreement or physical union between the soul and body 
consists, without either of them being able to change the laws of the other” (PNG 3/FW 260).   
In addition to these two well-known harmonies within Leibniz’s system, there is a third 
instance of his two realms doctrine that is neither widely recognized nor well-understood.  
  2Leibniz’s clearest statement of this further harmony appears in the Tentamen Anagogicum where 
he remarks: 
I usually say that there are, so to speak, two kingdoms even in corporeal nature, which 
interpenetrate without confusing or interfering with each other - the realm of power, 
according to which everything can be explained mechanically by efficient causes when 
we have sufficiently penetrated into its interior, and the realm of wisdom, according to 
which everything can be explained architectonically, so to speak, or by final causes when 
we understand its ways sufficiently.” (TA 479/G 273; emphasis added)   
This third harmony holds within the domain of the natural world, and is grounded for Leibniz in 
the existence of two complete sets of equipotent laws, with one set corresponding to the efficient 
causal order of the world, and the other to its teleological order.  The agreement between these 
two sets of laws of nature in turn serves as the basis for Leibniz’s view that every event in 
corporeal nature can, in principle, be explained either in terms of efficient or final causes.    
In what follows, I propose to explore the origins, foundations, and implications of the 
final-efficient harmony that Leibniz posits within the natural world itself.  The essay falls into 
four main parts.  The first looks to Leibniz’s much neglected work in optics for the roots of his 
view that the world can be seen as being governed by two complete sets of equipotent laws.  The 
second offers an account of how this picture of lawful over-determination is to be understood in 
light of Leibniz’s mature metaphysics.  The third considers the worry that Leibniz’s commitment 
to teleology within the order of nature undermines his commitment to efficient causal 
explanations, and thereby to the new science itself.  Finally, the fourth part suggests that 
Leibniz’s thinking about the harmony of final and efficient causes in connection with corporeal 
  3nature may help to shed light on his understanding of the teleological unfolding of monads as 
well.   
 
Explanatory Overdetermination in Geometrical Optics  
 
It is easy today to underestimate the importance of optics to seventeenth century natural 
philosophy.  Thought of the new science often first calls to mind Galileo’s experiments with 
descending bodies, Descartes’s rules of motion and impact, and, of course, the three laws of 
Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy.  Some effort might therefore be 
required to remind ourselves of Galileo’s discoveries with the newly invented telescope, that 
Descartes’s first systematic work in natural philosophy was appropriately titled “The World or 
Treatise on Light,” and that in his own time Newton’s fame rested as much on his Optics as it did 
on his Principia.  
It is likewise easy to miss the importance of Leibniz’s work in optics to the development 
of his mature natural philosophy.  Much attention has been paid to Leibniz’s interest in the laws 
of motion, his criticisms of the Cartesian rules of impact, and his attempt to establish the 
conservation of vis viva.
3  While these features of his scientific work help to underline his 
commitment to the broadly mechanical model of explanation championed by the new science, 
they provide little insight into Leibniz’s suggestion that there is a harmony even within the 
corporeal world, or, indeed, into his repeated claims that final causes may be useful even in the 
thick of doing physics.
4  To understand these aspects of his mature philosophy of science, we 
must look not primarily towards his mechanical studies, but rather towards his work in optics 
during the crucial decade or so following his years in Paris.     
  4The overarching theme of that work is the reconciliation of two radically different 
approaches to the laws of optics.
5  One approach Leibniz associates with Snell and Fermat, and 
the way of final causes.  In Fermat’s quickest path principle, Leibniz sees a profound avenue into 
the defense of the utility of final causes even in the practice of natural philosophy.  An 
alternative approach Leibniz associates with Descartes and his followers, and the way of efficient 
causes.  Although in optics, no less than in mechanics, Leibniz often emphasizes his 
disagreements with Descartes, he nonetheless clearly takes much of the Cartesian framework for 
granted.  Thus although he criticizes the details of Descartes’s derivations of the laws of optics, 
he never thinks to challenge the principal assumption which underlies them, namely, that the 
laws of light can be derived from broadly efficient-mechanical considerations.  
Leibniz’s strategy for defending the compatibility of teleological and efficient approaches 
to the laws of optics is most easily appreciated in the case of the law of reflection.  Although the 
law that - in standard cases - the angle of incidence of a reflected ray of light is equal to its angle 
of reflection had been known since at least the time of Euclid, Descartes attempted to show how 
it follows from the principles of his own mechanistic physics.  The proof of the law of reflection 
published in Descartes’s Dioptrics in 1637 relies on three crucial assumptions.
6   First, the 
behavior of a ray of light can be modeled on the behavior of material bodies, and thus can be 
treated as being governed by the laws of motion.  Second, the motion of a ray of light can be 
decomposed into orthogonal motions, which can in turn be considered independently of one 
another, and subsequently recomposed to yield the overall motion of the body under 
consideration.  Third, the direction of the downward component of a ray of light is reversed by a 
reflective surface, but is not otherwise altered, i.e. a ray of light loses none of its “speed” in 
rebounding off of a reflective surface.  
  5In an intriguing piece entitled “Metaphysical Definitions and Reflections,” dated by the 
Academie editors to 1678-1680 (at least six years prior to the publication of the Brief 
Demonstration) Leibniz offers an efficient causal explanation of the law of reflection taking for 
granted Descartes’s first two assumptions and offering a new argument for the third.  Letting 
DBE represent a reflecting surface, AB an incident ray of light, and GB and HB its decomposed 
orthogonal components, Leibniz asks us to consider the following diagram (where DBE 
represents a straight line, and F represents a point some distance below B): 
 
 
 
Leibniz argues that upon striking the reflecting surface, the ray of light causes the surface DBE 
to deform to a curve DFE so that when the surface is restored it imparts a motion BH to the ray 
of light.  He boasts that in providing this basis for Descartes’s third assumption, “we now have 
the reason for that which is elsewhere assumed without reason” (LC 1404/DC 255).  He goes on 
to argue in Cartesian fashion that the horizontal component GB is unaffected by the impact with 
the reflective surface, and thus that the composed motions GB=FL and BH=CL result in the 
reflected ray being as BC, and the angle of incidence ABG equaling the angle of reflection CBL.   
More remarkable than any novelty in the preceding derivation of the law of reflection is 
Leibniz’s claim that the same results can equally well be derived in the manner of Fermat by 
making use of final causes.
7  Letting DE be a reflecting surface, A a source of light (e.g. a 
  6flashlight) and C a light sink (e.g. an eye), Leibniz sets up the problem by asking which path 
AMC or ABC represents the actual path of the ray of light (where M could be any point on the 
surface DE): 
 
 
 
Leibniz suggests that the problem may be solved by appealing to the principle that “nature, 
proposing some end to itself, chooses the optimal means,” and thus that - given the uniformity of 
the medium - “there ought to be a reason only for a long or short journey” (DC 1405/LC 255).  
Since there is no unique longest path, Leibniz maintains that the actual path must be the shortest, 
i.e. it must be ABC from which it also follows that the angle of incidence ABD must be equal to 
the angle of reflection CBE.  Leibniz concludes that, at least for a standard class of cases,
8 the 
path of a ray of light can be determined by calculating the shortest reflected route from its source 
to its sink.   
In this non-Cartesian approach to the laws of optics, Leibniz sees the possibility of 
defending - at two different levels - the utility of appealing to final causes in doing natural 
philosophy.  First, as he more famously argues in connection with the laws of motion and 
impact, Leibniz maintains that consideration of God’s providential design of the world can help 
us to discover and explain the laws of nature themselves (e.g. DM 21, T 349).  Even without 
grasping God’s ends in detail, we might, Leibniz suggests, narrow the range of candidate laws 
  7for the actual world by supposing that in aiming to create an elegant and intelligible universe, 
God gives preference to laws that are orderly, continuous, and yield unique values for 
discoverable quantities such as distance, speed, and energy.  Because the imposition of such 
constraints is grounded in assumptions about God’s goal directed activity, Leibniz quite 
understandably sees them as the products of teleological reasoning.   
Second, Leibniz maintains that the suggestion that rays of light must follow optimal paths 
in standard cases of reflection opens the door to teleological explanations of the behavior of rays 
of light.  Much as we may explain, say, my taking the subway rather than a cab by appealing to 
the end of getting to Times Square as quickly as possible, Leibniz suggests that we may explain a 
ray of light’s passing through point B rather than M by appealing to the end of getting to C by 
the quickest or shortest path possible.
9  Significantly for Leibniz, in both cases a prior event - my 
taking the train, the light’s passing through point B - is explained by appealing to a likely 
outcome of that event - my arriving as quickly as possible at Times Square, the light’s arriving as 
quickly as possible at point C.  Although contemporary philosophers might well argue over 
whether or not the explanations offered by Fermat and Leibniz are “genuinely” teleological,
10 
there was no such dispute among early modern natural philosophers themselves.  Both the critics 
and champions of the Fermatian approach were in agreement that such explanations would 
introduce teleological explanations into natural philosophy, with Cartesians seeing this 
consequence as a decisive objection against them, and Leibniz seeing the reintroduction of final 
causes as the principal virtue of the Fermatian strategy.   
Leibniz’s project of reconciling what he sees as final and efficient explanations of optical 
phenomena received a significant boost from his discovery of how the Cartesian and Fermatian 
strategies could be brought into agreement in the case of the law of refraction.  Descartes had 
  8been the first to publish the law that the ratio of the sine of the angle of incidence to the sine of 
the angle of refraction is a constant determined by the media involved.
11 In order to derive this 
result in a manner consistent with his laws of motion and impact, however, Descartes was forced 
to assume that light behaves as if it travels faster in denser materials - an admittedly non-intuitive 
consequence that he and his followers nonetheless believed could be conclusively supported by 
mechanistic arguments.  That assumption, however, soon became a point of serious contention.  
For in order to argue that light takes the quickest path in cases of refraction, Fermat had to 
assume that light travels slower in denser materials since it is only on the assumption that light 
travels faster in, say, air than in water that a ray could possibly take the quickest path by 
traveling a greater distance in air in order to travel a lesser distance in water.   
In one of his most significant scientific papers, “A Unitary Principle of Optics, 
Catoptrics, and Dioptrics” published in the inaugural edition of the Acta Eruditorum (1682), 
Leibniz attempts to address the technical difficulties separating the Cartesian and Fermatian 
approaches as applied to cases of refraction.  On the one hand, he defends the Cartesian view that 
light travels faster in denser materials by arguing that denser materials are more resistant to the 
diffusion of light, and as a result effectively concentrate the force of rays of light so that they 
move more quickly than they would if they were allowed to dissipate as in less dense materials.  
On the other hand, Leibniz claims that light’s traveling faster in denser material is consistent 
with the spirit, if not the letter, of Fermat’s account of the law of refraction.  In brief, Leibniz 
argues that while it is true that in standard cases of refraction a ray of light does not take the 
quickest path between its source and sink, nonetheless it does take the easiest path as measured 
by the length of the path times the resistance of the medium.  This slight twist on Fermat’s 
principle allows Leibniz to once again insist on the fundamental compatibility between deriving 
  9optical results from efficient principles like the laws of motion and deriving them from putatively 
teleological principles like Fermat’s quickest path principle. 
Leibniz found still further support for his admittedly audacious conviction that natural 
phenomena in general might be explained either efficiently or teleologically when, in the early 
1690’s, he began working on a handful of problems that bore no obvious relationship to optics at 
all, but that nonetheless yielded to the same approach and mathematical techniques that had 
caught his attention in connection with optical phenomena.  These problems included, most 
famously, the finding of the shape of freely hanging chains suspended at both ends as well as 
discovering the quickest path of descent for a freely falling body between two points in the 
vertical plane.
12  Leibniz found that these problems could be solved by, as it were, considering 
all the possible paths or shapes that might constitute a solution, and identifying one of those 
paths as the actual solution by discovering a uniquely identifying property of it.  He could thus 
maintain that just as the end of taking the optimal path could be used to underpin the claim that 
optical phenomena might be explained teleologically, the ends of maximizing descent or 
minimizing time could be used to underpin the claim that a wide variety of natural phenomena 
could be given teleological explanations.   No proponent of the new science could, of course, 
doubt that phenomena such as the shapes of hanging chains, the falling of bodies, or the bending 
beams could, at least in principle, be explained in purely efficient terms.  These cases therefore 
provided Leibniz with impressive, if unexpected, support for his conciliatory view that all natural 
phenomena could be explained by appeal to teleological laws and final causes, as well as, to 
mechanistic laws and efficient causes.  
The empirical side of Leibniz’s program has since received yet another boost from the 
development of mathematical physics in the eighteenth century and beyond.  In 1747, 
  10Maupertuis introduced his principle of least action according to which “in all the changes that 
take place in the universe, the sum of the products of each body multiplied by the distance it 
moves and by the speed with which it moves is the least possible” (Maupertuis 1698-1759, 
2:274).  Although obscure and incomplete as it stood, the principle of least action was later 
clarified, developed, and set on secure mathematical foundations through the work of Euler, 
Lagrange, Hamilton, and Jacobi among others.  Through the work of such luminaries, the 
pragmatic value of the approach championed by Fermat, Leibniz, and Leibniz’s coterie has been 
placed beyond dispute, and the use of “variational principles” - the modern day descendents of 
the principles defended by Fermat and Leibniz - is pervasive throughout contemporary physics.  
It is now granted that such principles, while providing a powerful tool for solving a wide range 
of problems in physics, are nonetheless empirically equivalent - in the sense of yielding the same 
solutions to the same problems - as their non-variational counterparts.  Remarkably, Leibniz’s 
bold conjecture that a mathematically precise investigation of the natural world might follow two 
distinguishable - but nonetheless “parallel” - strategies has thus been supported by the 
development of physics since his time.
13
Leibniz’s work in optics and related problems provides him with a surprisingly sober 
route into his seemingly fantastic view that there are “two kingdoms even in corporeal nature - 
the realm of power, according to which everything can be explained mechanically by efficient 
causes . . . and the realm of wisdom, according to which everything can be explained 
architectonically, so to speak, or by final causes” (TA 479/G 273).
14  One might still wonder, 
however, how the suggestion of lawful overdetermination might be squared with the 
commitments of Leibniz’s mature metaphysics?  Or, for that matter, how we might make sense 
more generally of the thought that the world is governed by two complete, and equipotent, sets of 
  11laws of nature?  The next section will suggest that reflection on the place of the laws of nature in 
Leibniz’s larger philosophical system offers answers to both of these questions.   
 
The Metaphysics of Lawful Overdetermination 
 
Even those accustomed to the boldness of Leibniz’s metaphysics are prone to respond to 
his suggestion that there are two complete and equipotent sets of laws of nature with 
incredulity.
15  For it might understandably be thought that the notion of two sets of laws of 
nature is somehow ontologically incoherent or at the very least unacceptably baroque.  How or 
why, we might ask, are we to countenance two sets of laws of nature, when either set is by 
admission independently sufficient for governing all the events of the natural world?        
This line of objection to Leibniz’s account of explanatory overdetermination is most 
convincing given an ontologically robust conception of the laws of nature.  Perhaps the clearest 
example of such a conception would be one according to which the laws of nature are themselves 
counted as additional, non-reducible postulates with respect to the physical world.  Although 
Humean sympathies have in general led many philosophers today away from such a conception, 
Nicholas Jolley, for example, has attributed essentially such a view to Leibniz’s contemporary 
Malebranche.  According to Jolley, Malebranche’s god creates the world by willing the laws of 
nature - themselves identified with the propositional contents of divine volitions - together with 
initial conditions.  From these two sets of metaphysical primitives, the entire course of the world 
is then supposed to follow (Jolley 2002).  Different, but similarly robust, conceptions of the laws 
of nature can be found in the work of more contemporary philosophers.
16  In order to address a 
number of worries that appear to beset more reductive accounts, David Armstrong, for example, 
  12argues for identifying the laws of nature with primitive necessitating relations holding between 
genuine universals.  If we suppose that the positing of sets of necessitating relations and sets of 
laws of nature march in step, we arrive at a picture that is every bit as metaphysically substantial 
for our concerns as the one offered by Jolley’s Malebranche.   
Given such accounts of the laws of nature, we can begin to see why someone might think 
that the existence of two sets of equipotent laws threatens absurdity.  For if we suppose that there 
are two sets of laws - both of which independently necessitate a given range of phenomena - we 
might wonder which of them does the actual necessitating?  Indeed, we might see paradox 
lurking if we imagine that the two sets of laws happen to diverge ever so slightly.  Which set of 
laws should we expect the phenomena to obey and why?  At least some such worry appears to lie 
behind one commentator’s striking complaint in connection with Leibniz’s two realms doctrine 
that “even if the laws are in harmony with one another, subjects would still feel bewildered if 
they belonged to different realms” (Hirschmann 1988, 148).     
While it is granted that the specter of two metaphysically independent sets of laws of 
nature might raise some intuitional hackles, it is far from clear that, by itself, it supports a 
concrete argument against Leibniz’s unorthodox position.  It is, after all, generally granted that 
causal overdetermination is not merely possible but indeed non-extraordinary.  To borrow a 
standard example, it is widely granted that the breaking of a window might be overdetermined if 
two well-thrown bricks were to strike it at exactly the same time.  Given the possible 
overdetermination of effects by their causes, it is difficult to see what could rule out the 
possibility of the overdetermination of cause-effect relations by laws of nature themselves.  
Diverging sets of laws would, of course, present a more serious concern, but here the friend of 
lawful redundancy would seem well within her rights to reject as impossible the envisioned 
  13threat; there is no clear reason to concede that two sets of fundamental, equipotent laws 
governing the same phenomena could - non-miraculously at least - diverge, and Leibniz certainly 
never suggests that there is a possible world that is so afflicted.    
The critic of Leibniz’s position could at this point sensibly retreat to firmer ground, 
putting pressure not on the coherence of two sets of metaphysically independent laws of nature, 
but rather on the apparent metaphysical extravagance that such a position would entail.  She 
might reasonably argue that given a robust conception of the laws of nature, there could be no 
reason for postulating even two equally powerful, equally fundamental, laws of nature that 
accomplish exactly the same thing, much less for postulating two complete sets of laws of nature 
each of which would collectively yield exactly the same phenomena.  The argument here would 
no longer be that Leibniz’s view is impossible, but rather that it would violate a seemingly 
inviolable maxim of metaphysics - indeed of science more generally - namely, not to posit more 
entities where fewer will do.    
As compelling as this plea for ontological parsimony is likely to seem today, it is worth 
noting that Leibniz has deeply embedded theological reasons for resisting it.  Following a long 
tradition reaching back to at least Augustine, Leibniz maintains that existence itself is good.  (In 
this way, he is afforded an answer to the old philosophical chestnut of why something rather than 
nothing exists.)  But if existence itself is good, Leibniz is in a position to insist that in creating 
the best of all possible worlds God must seek to create as much being as possible.  Leibniz is 
therefore committed to something like the inverse of Ockham’s razor:  the only possible reason 
for something’s not existing is that it is inconsistent with other things that have an even greater 
claim to existence.
17  Given this background, it is hard to see why Leibniz should be moved to 
abandon his view of lawful overdetermination by considerations of ontological extravagance.  If 
  14two sets of laws, each grounded in its own set of metaphysical primitives, are mutually 
consistent, then by Leibniz’s lights the presumption should be that both sets of laws exist.  
Indeed, given Leibniz’s background metaphysical picture, the real challenge posed by robust 
accounts of the laws of nature is not “Why two instead of only one?” but rather “Why only 
two?”
18   
Nonetheless while Leibniz’s theodicy thus affords him a principled reason for simply 
embracing the charge of metaphysical extravagance, I think his position on the laws of nature 
does not require him to do so.  To see why, it may be helpful to consider two points, one of 
which brings Leibniz closer to a robust metaphysical conception of the laws of nature, and one 
that distinguishes his position from the ones we have been considering thus far.  
First, in distancing his own view from the position of occasionalism, Leibniz insists that 
the laws of nature must be grounded in genuine causal powers in the world.  In the case of 
physics, those powers will be the derivative (but well-founded) active and passive powers 
attributable to bodies.  Thus, in a letter to Basnage de Beauval of 1698, Leibniz writes:   
It is not enough to say that God has made a general law; for besides this decree there 
must be a natural means of executing it; that is, it is necessary that what happens can be 
explained through the nature that God gives to things.  (G IV 520/L 494)  
We need not be detained here by the question of whether or not Leibniz’s suggestion represents a 
deep criticism of the occaionalist’s position.
19  What is important for our purposes is simply that 
it highlights Leibniz’s commitment to the laws of nature being metaphysically well-founded in 
the (intrinsic) causal powers of the world.  In doing so, it brings Leibniz’s position somewhat 
closer to metaphysically robust views on the laws of nature insofar as it distinguishes the 
  15Leibnizian account from Humean accounts according to which the laws represent mere patterns - 
perhaps counterfactually stable patterns - in the mosaic of world events.   
Second, while Leibniz thus believes that the laws of nature must be grounded in genuine 
causal powers of the world, he does not suggest that the laws of nature themselves are distinct 
postulates with respect to the fundamental ontology of the natural world - as Jolley’s 
Malebranche, for example, suggests.  Rather in keeping with his general conceptualism 
concerning relations, Leibniz must maintain that the laws of nature are mental abstractions from 
the fundamental natures that are intrinsically grounded in the bedrock constituents of the world.  
In short, for Leibniz, although there must be metaphysically robust primitives that ground the 
laws of nature, the laws of nature do not themselves add anything on the side of ontology.  
Leibniz is thus able to maintain that the multiplication of laws of nature need not presuppose a 
corresponding multiplication in metaphysical primitives.  In this way, his picture is somewhat 
closer to Humean accounts than it might have seemed otherwise. For Leibniz, the laws of nature 
just are patterns - more specifically patterns abstracted by finite minds - with the crucial 
restriction that they must be well-founded on genuine causal powers in the world.
20   
With both points in place, it should be clear why Leibniz should not be troubled by the 
charge of metaphysical excess due to his postulation of two complete and equipotent sets of laws 
of nature.  For the postulation of two such sets merely amounts to the suggestion that we may 
abstract two adequate patterns from the distribution of causal powers found in the world.  
Abstracting in one way, Leibniz maintains, reveals the efficient-causal order of the world; 
abstracting in another way reveals the teleological order of the world.  Given Leibniz’s picture of 
the laws of nature, the charge of metaphysical extravagance due to postulating two sets of laws 
of nature clearly falls away; even the most miserly ontologist can be expected to tolerate two sets 
  16of abstractions where one might otherwise suffice.  To be sure, Leibniz’s suggestion remains 
audacious insofar as it is unclear that we can in fact discover two such promising sets of patterns 
in the world.  But the boldness here is now recognizably not an ontological issue but a broadly 
empirical one, and furthermore one which, as we have seen, Leibniz takes steps - if only 
preliminary steps - to address through his work in optics and related problems.  
 
Imperialistic Teleology? 
 
If it is granted that good ontological sense can be made of Leibniz’s postulation of two 
sets of equipotent laws, it might still be objected that Leibniz’s laws - or at least their natural 
extensions - cannot be used to support his two realms doctrine.  For it might be thought that one 
of Leibniz’s two realms must be the more fundamental or basic, and the other a mere formal or 
heuristic consequence.  Such is the thrust of an influential argument offered by David 
Hirschmann, who has suggested that Leibniz’s introduction of teleological laws of nature 
undermines his commitment to efficient, broadly mechanical, models of explanation 
(Hirschmann 1988,159).  Alluding to a widely accepted understanding of the relationship 
between “efficient laws” and “variational principles,” he writes: 
Of course, we know that Newton’s laws of motion and a most determined principle, the 
Principle of Least Action (in its modern form) are interderivable.  We may prefer, 
nevertheless, to think that Newton’s laws give the physics and that the Least Action 
principle is a powerful mathematical representation of them, powerful because of the 
problems we can solve by it.  Leibniz, for metaphysical reasons, is committed to the 
opposite.  There is a purely architectonic reason for a most determined principle and so 
  17for whatever it entails.  The kingdom of power’s laws are dictated by the rules of wisdom 
… The mechanization of the world picture is reconciled with piety by annexation.  
(Hirschmann 1988, 158-9) 
Hirschmann’s argument for this striking conclusion appears to rest on two principal premises.  
The first is that within Leibniz’s system there is a two-stage derivation of the efficient laws of 
nature beginning with God’s ends in creating the world, and passing through the creation of 
teleological laws of nature.  This derivation shows that the laws of the kingdom of power are not 
independent of the laws of the kingdom of wisdom.  The second is that the non-independence of 
the efficient laws shows that they are in some sense less fundamental than the teleological laws, 
and therefore that in Leibniz’s physics teleological explanations are in some sense more basic 
than their efficient cousins.   
  In assessing the threat to Leibniz’s two realms doctrine posed by Hirschmann’s line of 
argument, it should be helpful to consider each of his principal premises in turn.  The first stage 
of the argument in support of the non-independence premise underscores the familiar point that 
for Leibniz the teleological laws of nature must themselves be derivable from God’s providential 
design of the world.  Thus Hirschmann writes: 
The first stage of the argument, found in the Discourse, is an argument for design.  The 
sufficient reason for any contingent truth lies in the fact that God, who is perfectly good 
and has unlimited knowledge, has chosen from the infinite number of possible worlds to 
make actual the one which is objectively the best. . . . It is an exemplary case of rational 
explanation where motive and justification coincide.  It is a final reason and that there 
should be the best is the end or final cause of God’s creation of the world.  Anything 
  18explained by showing that it is required for the optimal perfection of this world is 
explained by final cause.  (Hirschmann 1988, 151f) 
Hirschmann’s first suggestion therefore is that Leibniz is committed to holding that the 
teleological laws of nature are derivable from God’s ends in creating the best of all possible 
worlds.  There is thus a teleological explanation of the teleological laws themselves.  The 
usurpation by the kingdom of ends has, in Hirschmann’s view, begun.   
  The second stage of the argument in support of the non-independence premise concerns 
the derivability of the efficient laws of nature from the teleological laws of nature.  Noting that 
“The next stage in the argument goes back to the principle of perfection and its use in the 
Tentamen Anagogicum,”
21 Hirschman argues: 
There are final causes in nature because the decree to create the best possible entails a 
principle of nature that the phenomena are most determined. . . . The one principle, to 
optimise perfection, determines uniquely.  At the same time, it determines the specific 
laws according to which the phenomena occur.  . . . The sole principle that determines 
what exists is the principle of the most determined ways. [156] . . . It seems unintelligible 
why God should order the phenomena in two ways when one will suffice.  The fact is he 
does not provide two sets of laws.  There is only one, provided by the principle that 
nature acts in the most determined ways.  As I have said above, the solutions to the 
extremum hypotheses give the laws, in particular, the laws of motion [158]  (Hirshmann, 
1988, 156-158).   
Having argued in the first stage that there is a teleological derivation of the principle that nature 
acts in the most determined ways, Hirschmann’s second suggestion points out that if that 
principle is held to determine the world uniquely, it must be possible to derive from it not only 
  19local teleological laws of nature (such as that light takes the easiest path between its source and 
sink) but also the efficient laws of nature as well (such as the efficient laws of motion).  Given 
that within Leibniz’s system one can derive the efficient laws of nature from teleological laws of 
nature which in turn can be derived from divine ends, Hirschmann concludes that the efficient 
ordering of nature is not, after all, really independent of its teleological ordering.   
While sympathetic to the broad outline of the derivation story that Hirschmann tells, I 
think we must nonetheless reject his closely related second premise to the effect that the non-
independence of the efficient laws from the teleological laws reveals them to be in some sense 
less fundamental or basic.  And, indeed, I think we should resist Hirschmann’s second premise 
not because the two sets of laws turn out to be more independent than we thought, but rather 
precisely because they are by Leibniz’s lights so thoroughly, mutually, and symmetrically 
dependent.  That is to say, far from insisting that the efficient and teleological laws of nature are 
completely independent, Leibniz should be understood as holding that the efficient and 
teleological orderings of the world are on a par with one another, and the defense of his view 
should be understood to rest on the claim that there is a perfect harmony between the world 
viewed in teleological terms and the world viewed in efficient-causal terms. 
What lies behind Hirschmann’s pessimistic reading of Leibniz’s two realms doctrine, I 
suggest, is thus not so much the dependencies he highlights as the dependencies he overlooks.  If 
we return to the first stage of his derivation we can readily see the symmetrical dependence 
implicit in Leibniz’s position.  For while it is true that the principle that nature always acts by the 
easiest and most determinate means can be seen to result from God’s providential activity, 
Leibniz insists that the case is the same for the efficient laws of nature.  Indeed, it is one of the 
hallmarks of Leibniz’s mature physics that the laws of nature do not hold of brute necessity but 
  20rather depend on contingent, and good-making considerations such as the principle of the 
equality of cause and effect, and the principle of continuity.  Within Leibniz’s system the 
efficient and teleological orders of the world thus would appear to be on a par.  God’s act of 
creation is responsible for both sets of laws, but there is no reason to suppose that he intends one 
set primarily with the other set being, as it were, a mere consequence of the intended set.  To 
Leibniz’s way of thinking, God should be understood as intending to create only one world, 
which may count among its positive features the fact that it can be understood equally well as 
being governed by efficient and teleological laws of nature.   
The situation is much the same with respect to the second stage of Hirschmann’s 
derivation.  He is clearly right to point out that in some sense the efficient laws of nature must be 
derivable from the teleological laws of nature if it is assumed that both are complete and 
equipotent.  Although the development of variational principles has made such derivations more 
perspicuous, Leibniz no doubt would have readily conceded - indeed insisted upon - the at least 
in principle inter-derivability of teleological and efficient laws of nature.  What he would have 
resisted - and understandably so - is that such inter-derivability shows that one set of laws must 
be more fundamental than the other.  Although it is true that “the laws of mechanics must be 
derivable from a final cause principle” it is equally true that it is a consequence of the laws of 
mechanics that nature always acts in the most determinate ways - that is to say, that the 
teleological laws of nature must be derivable from the principles of mechanics.  Given the 
symmetry of the case, there seems to be no reason to conclude that one ordering is more 
fundamental than the other.  Inter-derivability, far from showing that the kingdom of wisdom 
encroaches upon the kingdom of power, thus only further reinforces the strict parallelism upon 
which Leibniz insists.   
  21It is still possible of course to object that since God’s creative activity is itself goal 
directed, there is an inherent and inexpugnable bias in Leibniz’s system in favor of the kingdom 
of wisdom.  But this objection, I think, Leibniz could accept without doing any real damage to 
his two realms doctrine in its application to the natural world.  For acknowledging God’s 
providential design of the world need not in any way undermine the parallelism that Leibniz sees 
as holding within the created world itself.  He could, in short, consistently hold that there is a 
perfect harmony between the efficient and teleological laws of nature, while granting that both 
sets of laws derive from God’s wisdom rather than from God’s power.   
Nonetheless, to suggest that the establishment of the laws of nature is due primarily to 
God’s wisdom rather than God’s power is, I think, to fundamentally misunderstand Leibniz’s 
thinking about the nature of God’s free actions, and to underestimate Leibniz’s commitment to 
the symmetry of final and efficient causation.  In distancing himself from Descartes and Spinoza, 
Leibniz insists on a more than conceptual distinction between God’s will and God’s intellect.  
Without such a distinction, Leibniz fears, we undermine the objective goodness of God’s actions, 
and set ourselves on the road towards a fatalistic necessitarianism (TS 334/AG 333-34).  But no 
such worries beset the suggestion that there is only a conceptual distinction between God’s will 
considered as an efficient cause and God’s will considered as a final cause.  Indeed, Leibniz tells 
us that “It is clear ... there is in God the reason not merely for the greatness and power in the 
world mechanism ... but also for the goodness and wisdom exerted in establishing it (UO 305/L 
489).  By focusing on God’s concern for the good, Leibniz implies, we may emphasize the 
teleological flavor of God’s activity, but with equal justification by focusing on the 
efficaciousness of God’s will we may emphasize the efficient-causal flavor of God’s activity.  
Put simply, God’s will is simultaneously both an efficient cause and a final cause, and it is only 
  22by something like abstraction that one is emphasized at the expense of the other.  In this way, the 
parallelism that underpins Leibniz’s two realms doctrine with respect to the laws of nature 
holding within the world is nicely rounded out by a kind of parallelism in our understanding of 
God’s very act of creation - an example of the sort of harmony within harmony that Leibniz not 
only delights in, but takes as a mark of profound truth.   
 
Lawful Overdetermination and Monadic Teleology 
 
Up to this point our focus has been on the tenability of Leibniz’s account of teleology and 
teleological explanations within the domain of natural philosophy.  In this last section, I would 
like to suggest that that account may in turn help to shed light on his views on the teleological 
unfolding of monads themselves.  And, in particular, I would like to suggest that Leibniz’s 
thinking about explanatory overdetermination in physical domains provides him with one way 
out of an apparent tension in his treatment of monadic development.  The resolution of that 
tension, as we will see, implies that Leibniz’s most famous final-efficient harmony - the so-
called pre-established harmony of mind and body-rests on a more subtle and interesting 
foundation than one might have otherwise suspected.     
In approaching Leibniz’s treatment of monadic teleology, it will be helpful to have three 
pieces of his account of monadic development clearly in view.  First, Leibniz insists that we must 
attribute a primitive force, power, or nisus to each finite mental substance.  Although he 
maintains that monads are metaphysically indivisible and simple, he nonetheless insists that - 
like all created entities - they are subject to change, and indeed, to continuous change (Mon 10).  
Furthermore, Leibniz claims, the demands of continuous change require us to conceive of 
  23monads as being not only diverse at different stages of their careers, but also internally at each 
stage on pain of their otherwise having to “leap” from one stage to the next.  He describes each 
stage of a monad as a complex perceptual state, which represents not only the states of all other 
substances in the universe, but also contains “marks and traces” of every future and past state of 
the substance to which it belongs (DM 6).  For Leibniz, the primitive force attributed to monads 
serves as the immediate active cause driving the monad through its perceptual series from one 
cognitive state to the next. 
22
Second, Leibniz attributes to each monad its own distinct “law of the series” in 
accordance with which each monad unfolds under its own power in such a way as to fulfill its 
complete concept.  Leibniz’s suggestion that the development of each monad is governed by its 
own specific law - indeed by its own deterministic law - naturally invites a quasi-mechanical 
understanding of the unfolding of the perceptual states of a monad.
23  Beginning with a complex 
perceptual state at some time t1, a monad is driven by its own internal force, in accordance with 
its own law of the series, to assume its next complex perceptual state at time t2.  At t2, the monad 
is again driven by its own internal force, again in accordance with its own law of the series, to 
assume its next complex perceptual state at time t3, etc.
24  The analogy to Leibniz’s picture of the 
states of the physical world being driven in succession due to the activity of derivative forces in 
accordance with the laws of nature is irresistible, and no doubt intended on Leibniz’s part. 
Third, Leibniz maintains that the mental states of a monad unfold teleologically in 
accordance with “the motive of the good perceived by the understanding” (G 6:288).
25  He 
explicitly associates a monad’s “internal principle which brings about the change or passage 
from one perception to another” with both Aristotelian formal natures and appetites - both 
associations, of course, carrying with them teleological connotations.  Aristotle’s formal natures 
  24were viewed not only as sources of internal activity, but also as sources of internal activity 
inherently directed towards the completion, or perfection, of the substances to which they 
belong.  The language of appetite is, if anything, even more explicitly teleological, and in using it 
Leibniz clearly intends to capture the intuition that our mental lives unfold in a goal directed 
manner.  Indeed, in the case of monads corresponding to the souls of human beings, he even goes 
so far as to identify the cumulative effect of appetites with the will itself (see, for example, G 
3:622; NE 192). 
It is at this juncture, however, that one might begin to worry about the consistency of 
Leibniz’s characterizations of monadic activity.  And in particular one might worry that Leibniz 
is not entitled to present the monad both as unfolding in a teleological manner in accordance with 
the perceived good, and in a quasi-mechanical manner in accordance with its law of the series.  
Thus, for example, Robert Adams, after noting the teleological connotations suggested by 
Leibniz’s choice of the term “appetite,” warns:   
[T]he language of “appetite” and “ends and means” may be somewhat misleading.  It 
suggests the pursuit of a desired future state of affairs, but the action of a Leibnizian 
substantial form is more like what is sometimes called “acting on principle.”  In Leibniz’s 
view the “internal principle” governing “the passage [of a substance] from one perception 
to another” is not based on the desirability of the later perception in itself, but rather on 
the following of certain laws of nature.  (Adams 1994, 318)  
Quoting with approval the passage from Adams, Jonathan Bennett sharpens the implicit 
objection as follows: 
[L]eibniz’s account of monadic appetite does not justify his redescriptions of it in such 
teleological terms as “final causes” and “ends and means.”  His fundamental theory says 
  25only that the individual monad runs through its history in accordance with laws given to 
it by God, laws that govern the efficient causality of its unfolding. ... There seems to be 
no followable route from Leibniz’s basic metaphysic to the notion of doing something for 
the sake of an end . . . when his metaphysic is close at hand he has little to say about 
teleology except the blank assertion that final causes reign within the monad because of 
appetition.  (Bennett 2005, 139) 
The worry expressed here somewhat apologetically by Adams and more stridently by Bennett is 
that Leibniz is not really entitled to his claim that monads “act according to the laws of final 
causes, through appetitions, ends, and means.”  The thought is clearly that Leibniz’s quasi-
mechanical descriptions of monadic development undermine his commitment to genuine 
monadic teleology.  In fact, we might - paraphrasing Hirschmann - be tempted to cast the 
concern as implying that within the domain of psychology Leibniz’s teleological construal of 
monads is reconciled with the scientific ideal of efficient, mechanical explanation by annexation.    
   That the mirror image of the worry that we saw arise in connection with Leibniz’s 
defense of teleology in the domain of natural philosophy should arise in connection with his 
utilization of quasi-mechanical models in the domain of psychology is, of course, striking 
enough in its own right.  But it might also provide us with a clue pointing in the direction of a 
more sympathetic understanding of Leibniz’s views on monadic activity by suggesting that 
essentially the same considerations that made possible the reconciliation of derivative forces, 
efficient-mechanical laws, and optimization principles in the domain of natural bodies, might 
also make possible the reconciliation of primitive forces, quasi-mechanical models of monadic 
development, and the ascription of genuine teleology to finite minds.  That is to say, in short, 
  26Leibniz’s account of the explanatory overdetermination of the realm of nature might be thought 
to be mirrored by an explanatory overdetermination at the level of monads themselves.   
According to such a picture, primitive forces would play the metaphysical role at the 
monadic level that we have seen derivative forces play at the level of the bodies studied by 
physics.  They would be the created sources of genuine activity in the world satisfying the 
intuition that in addition to particular patterns in nature, there are also real causal powers that 
shape, determine or “necessitate” those patterns.  Just as someone might hold that regular 
patterns of physical events - e.g. heavy bodies falling near the surface of the earth - must be 
underpinned by real causal powers in nature, so likewise Leibniz holds that the determined 
patterns of mental events occurring within finite minds must similarly be underpinned by real 
causal powers inherent in created minds.  For Leibniz, primitive forces thus serve as the 
immediate causes of change within a monad in much the way that derivative forces serve as the 
immediate causes of change within the realm of the physical world.   
As we have seen, however, Leibniz denies that the explanatory resources of physics are 
limited to causal powers or natures.  Although such powers are essential for warding off 
metaphysical pitfalls, and satisfying certain natural intuitions, the mechanical philosophy 
suggests that we must also think of the world as being governed by regular laws of nature.  
Leibniz reasonably treats such laws not as additional fundamental elements of the physical 
world, but rather as patterns abstracted from the underlying causal powers that he takes to be 
determining the unfolding of physical events.  Such a picture of the relationship between causal 
powers and the efficient laws of nature, however, in turn suggests a rather intuitive corollary 
picture of the relationship between primitive forces and a monad’s “law of the series.”  Although 
a monad’s primitive force is immediately responsible for its progression from one stage to 
  27another, one might reasonably suppose that its entire causal pattern, “recipe,” or “program,” as it 
were, could be considered in the abstract at least by an infinite intellect.  If that pattern were 
particular enough to specify its every development, one might identify it with a monad’s own 
specific “law of the series.”  The creation of a monad could thus be thought of as the creation of 
an initial state, or causal nexus, capable of producing an entire series of mental states in 
accordance with its own particular “law of the series.”
26   
Although the possibility of conceiving of a monad as being generated from an initial state 
and a law of the series might seem to speak against its developing teleologically, Leibniz’s work 
in optics once again suggests a strategy for reconciliation.  Just as Leibniz suggests that we can 
think of the physical world both as unfolding in accordance with a mechanical pattern of 
efficient causes as well as a teleological pattern of final causes, so too we might think of a monad 
as being governed by both an efficient quasi-mechanical law of the series as well as a 
teleological principle of acting in accordance with the perceived good.  Crucial here is the 
thought that the genuine causal powers postulated both at the physical and mental level are in 
and of themselves neutral with respect to being characterized as efficient or teleological.  When 
subsumed under a regular pattern linking prior events to their immediate successors, such causal 
powers can be identified with non-teleological causes, and explanations can be generated by 
showing that a subsequent event follows from prior conditions and the efficient laws of nature.  
When subsumed under a regular pattern linking prior events to later events via reference to the 
expected outcomes of those events, such causal powers can be identified with teleological 
causes, and explanations can be generated by showing that a later event follows from prior 
conditions, expected outcome conditions, and the teleological laws of nature.  From a God’s eye 
perspective, at least, nothing should rule out being able to understand the progression of a monad 
  28from one state to another as following both in accordance with an efficient lawful pattern as well 
as in accordance with a teleological lawful pattern.  The possibility of a lawful and explanatory 
overdetermination is no less coherent here than it is in the domain of optics and physics.   
If all of this points towards a possible solution of the tension highlighted by Adams and 
Bennett, it also (perhaps surprisingly) suggests that Leibniz’s most famous harmony - the pre-
established harmony between mind and body - rests on a more subtle foundation than we might 
have otherwise imagined.  In speaking of his proposed solution to the mind-body problem, 
Leibniz generally emphasizes the compatibility of thinking of the mind as unfolding in 
accordance with a teleological order even while thinking of the body as unfolding in accordance 
with an efficient causal order: 
Souls act according to the laws of final causes, through appetitions, ends, and means.  
Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes or of motions.  And these two 
kingdoms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, are in harmony with each 
other.  (Mon 79/AG 223) 
Leibniz, of course, had good reasons to highlight this particular final-efficient harmony.  It 
represents the most intuitive presentation of his own position as an alternative to the solutions to 
the mind-body problem offered by the likes of Descartes, Spinoza and Malebranche.  
Furthermore, he might have reasonably hoped that he could win converts to his account of the 
mind’s relationship to the body even from among those who would not accept - or even 
understand - his sophisticated views in optics and physics.  Nonetheless, Leibniz’s commitment 
to the legitimacy of teleological explanations even in the thick of doing natural philosophy 
suggests that his usual presentation of the pre-established harmony only tells part of the story.  A 
more complete exposition, it seems, would reveal that the teleological and efficient harmony 
  29holding between the mind and body rests in turn on a pair of lawful and explanatory harmonies 
holding both within the domain of the mind and within the domain of the body itself.  The 
explanatory parallelism of the mind and body is, in short, grounded in an explanatory parallelism 
of the mind as well as an explanatory parallelism of the body.    
 
Conclusion 
 
Leibniz was not, of course, the first to suggest that events in the natural world might be 
explained by appeal either to final or efficient causes - Aristotelians for example had long 
maintained that natural events could be explained both ways, and Leibniz himself implies that 
his own project can trace its origins to Plato (see, in particular, TS).  Nonetheless, Leibniz’s 
engagement with the new science of his time led him to a particularly novel, systematic, and 
intriguing picture of final-efficient explanatory overdetermination.  In this essay, I have tried to 
provide a preliminary sketch of the origins, foundations, and implications of the picture he 
develops.  Accordingly, I have first indicated an important source of Leibniz’s two realms 
doctrine in his early attempts to reconcile Cartesian and Fermatian derivations of the laws of 
optics.  Second, I have argued that that doctrine can be shown to rest on surprisingly sober 
foundations provided that Leibnizian laws are viewed as abstractions from the intrinsic, well-
founded, derivative forces attributable to bodies.  And lastly, I have suggested that a proper 
understanding of Leibniz’s position with respect to explanatory overdetermination within the 
domain of nature may provide insight into his understanding of monadic teleology and the 
supposed pre-established harmony between mind and body.
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1 I use the following abbreviations for Leibniz’s texts (full references are provided in the 
bibliography):  A= German Academy of Sciences (ed.) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz:  Sämtliche 
Schriften und Briefe, 1926-; AG=R. Ariew and D. Garber (eds. and trans.) G. W. Leibniz:  
Philosophical Essays, 1989; DC= G. W. Leibniz, “Definitiones Cogitationesque Metaphysicae,” 
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1678; DM=G. W. Leibniz, “Discourse on Metaphysics,” 1686; FW= R. Franks and R. 
Woolhouse (eds.) G. W. Leibniz:  Philosophical Texts, 1998; G=C. I. Gerhardt (ed.) Die 
Philosophischen Scriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 1875-90; L=L. Loemker (ed. and 
trans.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz:  Philosophical Papers and Letters 2
nd Edition, 1969); 
Mon=G. W. Leibniz, “Monadology,” 1714a; LC=Richard Arthur, ed and trans. G. W. Leibniz, 
The Labyrinth of the Continuum, Writings on the Continuum Problem, 2001; SD= G. W. 
Leibniz, “Specimen of Dynamics,” 1695; NE=G.W. Leibniz, “New Essays on Human 
Understanding” 1705; PNG=G. W. Leibniz, “Principles of Nature and Grace,” 1714b; TA=G. 
W. Leibniz, “Tentamen Anagogicum,” 1696; T=G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy, 1710; TS=G. W. 
Leibniz, “Two Sects of Naturalists” 1677-1680; UO=G. W. Leibniz, “On the Ultimate 
Origination of Things,” 1697.  I have used the following abbreviations for Descartes’s texts:  
AT= C. Adam and P. Tannery (eds.) Oeuvres des Descartes, 12 Volumes, 1897-1913; CSM=J. 
Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (eds.) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 
Volumes 1 and 2, 1985.  
2 For further general discussion of Leibniz’s two realms doctrine see Bennett (2005) and Broad 
(1975, 165-172).    
3 For discussion of these aspects of Leibniz’s physics, see for starters, Garber (1998) and 
Gueroult (1967).   
4 See, for example, DM, TA, UO, and TS passim.   
5 For a more detailed discussion of Leibniz’s reconciliation project, see McDonough (2007).     
6 See, especially, the first two discourses of Descartes’s Optics (AT 81-105/CSM 1:152-164).  
For an unabridged edition of Descartes’s Optics in English, see his (1965, 65-173).  It is perhaps 
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worth noting that Descartes takes the second and third assumption to follow from the first given 
his understanding of the laws of motion and impact.   
7 Cf. Fermat’s elegant proof that if light travels faster in one medium than in another, its quickest 
path will not be a straight line (Fermat 1891-1912, 2:457-63).   
8 Assuming (at least) that the reflecting surface is planar and the medium uniform and isotropic.  
As we will see below, Leibniz also considers more complicated cases as well.   
9 Like many others - including Aristotle of course - Leibniz does not assume that the attribution 
of ends in nature presupposes a mental awareness in nature of those ends.   
10 For arguments that they are not genuinely teleological, see especially Bennett (1976, 75-78; 
2001, 1:271-2), Nagel (1979, 285-290), and Yourgrau and Mandelstam (1968, 176).  
McDonough 2007 attempts to defend Leibniz’s characterization against the charges that (i) it 
violates commonsense and linguistic intuition, (ii) would make the distinction between the 
teleological and non-teleological otiose, and (iii) fails to appreciate the mathematical equivalence 
of laws expressed in terms of variational and non-variational equations.  For an interesting 
discussion of other related issues, see Stöltzner (1994, 1999, and 2000).     
11 Dissatisfaction with Descartes’s proofs, and surrounding circumstances, soon led to the charge 
that Descartes had, in fact, learned the law from Snell’s work while residing in Holland.  
Although the charge was first publicly expressed by Isaac Vossius in 1662, doubts concerning 
the originality of Descartes’s discovery were shared by both Huygens and Leibniz (see, Vossius 
1662, 36; Huygens 1888-1950, 8:9 and 10:405; Leibniz TA 274/L 479-80 and DM 22/L 317-18).  
In spite of the array of talent aligned against Descartes, the evidence seems at best inconclusive.  
For further discussion of the dispute, see Korteweg (1896, 489-501) and Sabra (1967, 99-116).    
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12 For general discussion of the development of such problems see, especially, Mach (1989), 
Lemons (1997), and Yourgrau (1968); for discussion of them in connection with Leibniz in 
particular, see McDonough (2007).   
13 For more on the history of the development of the calculus of variations, see Goldstine (1980), 
Mach (1989), and Woodhouse (1810).   
14 One needn’t, of course, suppose that this is Leibinz’s only route into his two realms doctrine.  
In currently unpublished work, Daniel Garber, for example, emphasizes the importance of 
theological and anti-spinozistic reasons leading Leibniz to his two realms doctrine.   
15 In what follows, I will assume that both sets of laws hold exactly, and bracket concerns arising 
from the possibility of miracles.  As Alan Nelson pointed out to me, if Leibniz were willing to 
allow that the laws of nature could hold with differing exactness, or that they admit of different 
miraculous exceptions, the task of defending his postulation of two sets of “generically” 
complete laws would be that much easier.     
16 For three classic robust accounts, see Armstrong (1978, 1983, 1991, 1993), Dretske (1977), 
and Tooley (1977, 1987).  See also the more recent non-reductive accounts offered by Carroll 
(1994) and Lange (2000).  Finally, for a view that is interestingly similar in important respects to 
the view attributed to Malebranche by Jolley, see Maudlin (unpublished).   
17 See, for example, G III 444; G IV 294, 404-405; NE 438, and UO 303/L 487.   
18 Cf. Spinoza’s commitment to there being infinitely many attributes (1677 1p9, 1p11d, 2p7s; 
and 1661, 64n).  
19 On this issue, see Jolley (2005) and Rutherford (1993).   
20 Leibniz’s understanding of the laws of nature as abstractions from causal natures has been 
more widely discussed in connection with his account of miracles.  In brief, Leibniz holds that a 
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miracle occurs where something happens that exceeds the causal powers of created beings (AG 
83).  For discussion of Leibniz’s account of laws in relation to miracles, see especially Adams 
(1994, 85-94), Sleigh (1990, 162-170), and Rutherford (1993).  For a stimulating account of 
Leibnizian abstraction in connection with his account of eternal truths, see Nelson (2005).   
21 Beginning at Hirschmann (1988, 152).   
22 Because it would only distract from the central point, I set aside here Leibniz’s commitment to 
divine concurrence.  For discussion, texts, and references, see especially Lee (2004).  For an 
account that attempts to preserve a more robust conception of secondary causation for Leibniz’s 
created substances, see McDonough (unpublished).     
23 “Quasi-mechanical” rather than “mechanical” because the operations of the mind cannot, 
according to Leibniz, be understood in terms of shapes and motions.  See, for example, Mon 17. 
24 This, of course, is but a crude first pass:  a more careful account would have to take into 
account (at a minimum) Leibniz’s apparent commitment to the continuous nature of monadic 
change and time’s being non-basic in his mature metaphysics.  Such subtleties, however, should 
not be necessary for our purposes.  For an interesting discussion of these topics, and a route into 
the literature, see John Whipple (unpublished).        
25 As Donald Rutherford has noted, when Leibniz discusses monadic teleology he sometimes has 
in mind a monad’s tendency towards an objectively optimal state of affairs, and sometimes a 
tendency towards a merely perceived, or apparently, optimal state of affairs.  Corresponding to 
these two conceptions of teleology we might, following Rutherford, distinguish between the 
“laws of natural teleology” and the “laws of desired teleology,” where the former will be 
applicable to all monads and the latter will be reserved for monads to which will and 
understanding can be attributed.  Although the language of acting for a “perceived good,” or for 
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the “apparent good,” might thus be strained, or even inappropriate, in the case of non-reflective 
monads, since all monads unfold in such a way as realize their full natures, and thereby realize 
the perfection of the world, their activity for Leibniz will nonetheless be describable in terms of 
teleological laws.  See, Rutherford (2005, 166-168).    
26 See, for example, Cover and Hawthorne (1999, 214-252).   
27 I would like to thank Paul Hoffman, Nicholas Jolley, Alison Simmons, John Whipple, and 
especially Alan Nelson for their helpful comments and discussions in connection with this paper.     
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